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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 17-2420 & 17-3508 
________________ 
 
STEVE DEVIN GREGOR BALBOSA, 
a/k/a Steve Brown, 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
       Respondent 
     ________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
(BIA No. A044-250-567) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 11, 2018 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 15, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
Petitioner Steve Devin Gregor Balbosa, a native and citizen of Trinidad and 
Tobago, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his 
appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision to deny his request for protection under the 
Convention Against Torture. He also petitions us to review the Board’s denial of his 
motion to reopen its adverse decision.  
The Board had jurisdiction to review the Immigration Judge’s decision under 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and we have jurisdiction to review the Board’s final 
order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). “We exercise de novo review over 
constitutional claims or questions of law and the application of law to facts.” Garcia v. 
Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). We review the 
Immigration Judge’s findings only to the extent they were incorporated into the Board’s 
decision. Id.; Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Balbosa argued to the Board that he was likely to face torture—with the consent, 
acquiescence, or willful blindness of the Government—if he returned to Trinidad and 
Tobago. The Board denied Balbosa’s appeal because it found his subjective fear of return 
to a country with a high crime rate and where he has few contacts does not establish a 
likelihood he would face torture if removed there. It also found Balbosa’s evidence that 
the Government of Trinidad and Tobago is seeking to prevent rising crime in part by 
focusing on deportees with criminal records does not establish that a public official or 
other individual acting in an official capacity would acquiesce to torture against him. For 
these two reasons, it agreed with the Immigration Judge’s determination that Balbosa has 
not established he qualifies for protection under the Convention.  
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The Board did not make any findings concerning whether Balbosa’s criminal 
conviction was for a particularly serious crime, which would have barred him from 
asylum relief. Only the Immigration Judge made this determination, and it was not 
incorporated into the Board’s decision. Hence Balbosa’s argument to us that the 
Immigration Judge erred is beyond the scope of our review. Further, the Board did not err 
(or violate Balbosa’s Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process) by considering 
the issue waived: Balbosa did not appeal this part of the Immigration Judge’s decision to 
the Board, and thus he did not take advantage of the process available to him.  
Balbosa also argues the Board applied the wrong legal standard to find there was 
no evidence the Government would acquiesce to torture, as “acquiescence” includes 
failure to protect those targeted from the torture. See Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 
671 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 2011). But again, Balbosa did not make this argument to the 
Board, nor has he shown us evidence that supports his allegation that the Government 
fails to protect deportees targeted by gangs. Balbosa presents no other arguments for 
reversal of the Board’s decision, and thus we deny his petition for review.1 
Next we turn to Balbosa’s challenge to the Board’s denial of his motion to reopen its 
adverse decision, which we review for abuse of discretion.  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 
145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).  The Board had jurisdiction to reopen proceedings under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and we have jurisdiction, as above, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
 
                                              
1 Though we reach no holding on the Government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction 
because Balbosa brings only unexhausted claims, we agree that Balbosa’s claims are 
either unexhausted or lack sufficient merit. 
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Balbosa moved to reopen the Board’s adverse decision on the ground he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel who failed to contest his status as an aggravated felon 
and that his conviction was for a particularly serious crime. The Board denied his motion 
because, even assuming counsel was ineffective, Balbosa did not show he suffered 
prejudice as a result of the attorney’s handling of his case. Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 
142, 157, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2007). The standard it applied required Balbosa to show there 
is a “reasonable likelihood” that the result of the removal proceedings would have been 
different had the errors not occurred. Id. at 159. This requires him to show “not just that 
he received ineffective assistance in his removal proceedings, but that the challenged 
order of removal is fundamentally unfair, because there is a significant likelihood that the 
[Immigration Judge] would not have entered an order of removal absent counsel’s 
errors.” Id. Applying this standard to Balbosa, the Board held he presented no argument 
that he is not removable as charged nor that the Immigration Judge erred in ordering him 
removed under Immigration and Naturalization Act §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (a)(2)(B)(i). 
Hence it held he did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the attorney’s alleged 
ineffective assistance affected either his removability or eligibility for relief. 
Balbosa argues the Board incorrectly interpreted Fadiga’s “reasonable likelihood” 
standard; it applied too rigorous a standard, and he only needed to show prima facie 
eligibility and a “realistic chance” that he might be able to obtain his requested relief. 
Even if the Fadiga standard required only prima facie eligibility, Balbosa does not argue 
he made a showing to the Board that his conviction was not for an aggravated felony or a 
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particularly serious crime, nor does he make this showing to us. Accordingly, we cannot 
say the Board abused its discretion by denying Balbosa’s motion to reopen.  
 Thus we deny Balbosa’s petition for review of the Board’s dismissal of his appeal 
and its denial of his motion to reopen. 
